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Abstract 
During the housing bust of 2008–2009, home prices and transaction volumes fell across the 
entire United Kingdom. However, while the fall in prices was similar across housing types, 
transaction volumes fell more for homes at the lower end of the market. I document this fact 
and use an overlapping-generations model to relate it to the reduction in loan-to-value ratios 
by British banks and to derive additional predictions. As down-payment requirements 
increase, young households with scarce financial resources are priced out by older owners 
who retain their previous housing for renting when trading up. Recent changes in aggregate 
housing tenure as well as changes in the number of sales and rentals in areas with different 
age composition are consistent with the model predictions. The insights presented here 
inform recent policy discussions about reduced access to home ownership by the young. 
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1 Introduction
Between the last months of 2007 and the first of 2008, home prices and trans-
action volumes started falling across all UK regions. By mid 2009, the Land
Registry price index had experienced a nominal drop of 17% from its peak
while transactions had fallen by 60%. In this paper I show that while the
reduction in prices was similar across home types, transaction volumes fell
more for homes at the lower end of the market. To document this fact I use an
administrative dataset on the universe of private housing market transactions
in England and Wales. Figure I illustrates this result. The left panel plots the
median percentage change in prices between 2007 and 2009 against a measure
of housing quality (described below). We see that the relationship is close to
being flat. The right panel shows the same plot for the median percentage
change in transactions. In this case we see that the fall in transactions was
substantially higher for lower-quality homes.1
My proposed explanation for this change in transactions relates to the
tightening of credit conditions in the UK during 2008, and in particular to the
sharp reduction of the Loan-to-Value ratios of mortgages offered by British
banks. On account if this, I propose a housing ladder model with borrowing
constraints and renting in which credit conditions affect the composition of
sales. In the model, greater downpayment requirements hinder home pur-
chases by young households with less wealth. In turn, older and wealthier
households become ‘accidental landlords’ who keep their previous home and
rent it instead of selling it when moving up the housing ladder. The fact that
these entry-level homes are rented instead of being sold is what drives the
change in the composition of transactions: sales of lower quality homes make
up a smaller fraction of the total when downpayment requirements increase.
In addition to reproducing the stylized fact outlined above, the model deliv-
ers additional predictions that are tested empirically: tighter credit leads to
an increase in private renting, a negative cross-sectional correlation between
renting and transactions and less purchases by the young. Using highly disag-
gregated geographical data I test these implications and find support for the
underlying mechanism.
The results presented in this paper inform recent policy debates in the
United Kingdom and, more generally, concerns in this and other countries
about how credit affects access to home-ownership. According to several
1The linear correlation between quality and the change in prices is 0.04 while for quality
and the change in transactions it is 0.19.
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FIGURE I
MEDIAN CHANGE IN PRICES AND TRANSACTIONS BY HOME QUALITY
market participants and government officials, the difficulties faced by young
households trying to buy their first homes have held back the housing market
recovery. Alistair Darling, chancellor of the Exchequer, declared in 2010: “The
housing market has now stabilized and has begun a slow recovery. But many
first-time buyers, particularly those without large deposits, still find it hard to
get a mortgage.” His and subsequent governments have tried several policies
to help first-time buyers. Given these interventions, understanding the mech-
anism through which changes in lending conditions affect housing tenure for
different households has significant policy implications.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature studying housing cy-
cles for different market segments within cities. Previous studies have docu-
mented how the prices for homes of different qualities change over the hous-
ing cycle, particularly during boom periods such as the early 2000s in the US.2
2Smith and Tesarek (1991) study the evolution of home prices across qualities during a
boom-bust episode in the 80s. Several studies seek to explain within-city changes in prices
during the recent US housing boom (e.g. Ferreira and Gyourko (2011), Glaeser, Gottlieb and
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Instead, this paper documents the evolution of both prices and transactions,
and focuses on a bust period 2007-2009 and on the UK. Incorporating trans-
actions into the analysis is relevant because, as shown below, in the period
studied here the disparity between segments is larger in the dynamics of trans-
action volumes than in the dynamics for prices.
My contribution is also related to the theoretical literature on the effects
of credit constraints on housing prices and transaction volumes. Stein (1995)
presents a partial equilibrium model linking down-payment requirements and
sale volumes. Its mechanism is cast into a housing model with endogenous
prices in Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1999) and Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006).
In these studies the change in the time series for transactions emerges from
capital gains (or losses) on starter homes. While the model below partially
builds on the framework present in Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) I propose
an alternative mechanism relating borrowing constraints and sales by empha-
sizing the link between housing ladder transitions and the supply of rented
homes. In this sense, I draw attention to the relationship between the composi-
tion of sales and changes in home-ownership rates. Moreover, the qualitative
predictions from my model refer to the variation in the impact of borrowing
constraints on sale volumes across home types rather than on the time series
of total transactions.
Finally, this paper also related to the empirical literature studying the co-
movement of prices and transactions on housing markets. Evidence of the
positive time series correlation is presented in Berkovec and Goodman (1996),
Lamont and Stein (1999) for the US and Andrew and Meen (2003), Ortalo-
Magne and Rady (1999), Benito (2006) for the UK. This is already a well es-
tablished fact and a qualitative feature of several housing market models. My
contribution is to study how this co-movement varies across home qualities,
how simultaneous changes in prices and transactions were different for dif-
ferent housing segments.
The data used in the empirical sections of this paper is presented in section
2. To document the main stylized fact on transactions and prices I use the
Price Paid Dataset offered by the UK Land Registry. This rich administrative
dataset covers all regular residential transactions in England and Wales. Its
Tobio (2012) and Guerrieri, Hartley and Hurst (2013)). Landvoigt, Piazzesi and Schneider
(2012) do document a change in both transactions and prices for different market segments
in San Diego between 2000 and 2005. They focus on matching the joint distributions of
wealth, income and qualities using an assignment model which takes the quality distribu-
tion of traded homes as given.
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high coverage is essential in order to study possible changes in transactions for
different qualities over time. Section 3 presents recent trends in UK housing
and credit markets.
In Section 4 I document how home prices and transactions changed be-
tween 2007 and 2009 for different segments within English and Welsh metropoli-
tan areas.3 To do so, I propose two different estimates of unobserved quality.
The first uses location, home type and sale prices of observed transactions to
construct a proxy. As an alternative, I restrict the sample to repeat-sales and
use previous selling prices to estimate the quality of individual homes. Re-
assuringly, both methods yield similar results. Homes of different qualities
experienced a similar fall in prices. In contrast, transactions fell substantially
more for lower quality homes in all metropolitan areas, changing the compo-
sition of sales. Section 5 documents the robustness of these empirical results.
The findings are interpreted in the context of recent academic and policy
discussions highlighting the role of credit constraints in housing markets and
their effect on young households. Section 6 presents a housing ladder model
with renting and credit constraints in which households differ in age and in-
come. Using this framework I show that steady states with tighter lending
conditions have a lower number of first-time buyers, a right-shifted composi-
tion of traded qualities and higher levels of renting. In addition, tighter credit
leads to more let-to-buy (households keeping their homes and renting them
when trading up) and less buy-to-let (households buying a home as an invest-
ment). All of these results are driven by the pricing out of young buyers by
wealthier, older households when credit is tighter.
Evidence supporting these model implications and the underlying mecha-
nism is presented in Section 7. Using disaggregated information on the evolu-
tion of housing tenures I show a strong negative correlation between the fall
in transactions and the increase in renting. This correlation is consistent with
the model predictions and is robust to changes in local economic conditions.
In addition, I show that the change in transactions had a clear age profile. Us-
ing census data on age of residents, I distinguish between young and old areas
within a city. Analysing prices and transactions for these two groups, results
are similar to those obtained for quality levels: the change in price is similar
across neighbourhoods but transactions fell more in young areas, even after
controlling for neighbourhood quality.
3The definition of metropolitan area used is the Travel-To-Work Area, which is analogous
to a Local Labour Market in the United States.
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Other explanations which could also account for the change in composi-
tion of home sales are discussed in Section 8. I study whether negative equity,
changes in internal migration patterns or increases in repossessions explain
my results. I find no evidence in this direction. Finally, Section 9 concludes by
discussing policy implications and avenues for further research.
2 Data
Price Paid Dataset
Throughout most of this paper I use Land Registry data covering the vast ma-
jority of residential transactions in England and Wales.4 In particular, I use the
Price Paid dataset available at the Land Registry’s website. It includes free-
hold and leasehold transactions for the 1995-2013 period recording the trans-
action price, postcode, address, an indicator of dwelling type (detached, semi-
detached, terrace or flat), contract type (freehold or leasehold) and whether
the home is a newbuild.
The price paid data for the 1995-2013 period includes a total of 18,744,353
transactions of which 22.9% are leasehold transactions. Given that these trans-
actions do not include information of the lease term I exclude them from the
analysis. I also exclude all of the 1,905,779 newbuild sales as they are related
to construction activity which fell abruptly after its peak in 2007. As will be
shown below, neither of these restrictions have a qualitative effect on my find-
ings. Finally, I drop all transactions missing location data as this information
is crucial in both my baseline and repeat-sales estimates. This implies losing
a further 18,640 observations. These sample restrictions are summarized in
Table I.
Detailed account of sample restrictions for the Land Registry dataset.
The final transactions dataset encompasses a total of 12,537,180 transac-
tions for the 1995-2013. In Section 4 I focus on a Repeat-sales sample of homes
sold at least twice over my sample period. There are a total of 9.4342.390 trans-
actions in my Repeat-sales dataset.
4The Price Paid dataset excludes properties bought by corporate bodies or businesses,
homes sold as part of an asset portfolio, repossessed homes, sales of homes having an existing
mortgage, and transfers under court order.
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TABLE I
SAMPLE RESTRICTIONS
Observations % of Full Sample
Full Sample 18,744,353 100%
Leaseholds 4,301,626 22.9%
Newbuilds 1,904,779 10.2%
Missing Postcodes 18.640 0.1%
Final Sample 12,537,180 66.8%
Repeat-Sales Sample 9,342,390 49.8%
Other Data Sources
Population counts and age structures at the Lower Super Output Area level
are obtained combining population estimates by the Office for National Statis-
tics (ONS) and census data for 2001 and 2011. Disaggregated Data on housing
tenure distributions is taken from the 2001 and 2011 census. Internal migra-
tion data is obtained from the ONS. Finally, data on the housing stock and
the number of vacant homes, both at the Local Authority District level, are
obtained from the Housing Strategy Statistical Appendix (HSSA). Data on ag-
gregate tenure distributions is obtained from the English Housing Survey.
I use the National Statistics Postcode Lookup Directory to match this geo-
graphical information with the Land Registry dataset. The NSPL links post-
codes with all the relevant geographies in the UK.
Geographies
Throughout the paper I use data at different levels of geographical disaggrega-
tion. When speaking about aggregate quantities I refer to England and Wales
only. Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate Land Registries and home
sales taking place there are not included in my data on transactions. My work-
ing definition of housing markets is the Travel-to-Work Area (TTWA). TTWAs
are analogous to local labour markets for the US and are built using informa-
tion on UK commuting patterns. There are a total of 186 travel-to-work areas
in England and Wales.
Within TTWAs I use information at the lower super output area, postcode
sector and postcode district levels. Lower super output areas (LSOAs) are de-
fined for the collection and publication of data by the ONS. They represent
the smallest area at which census data is disclosed. There are 34,753 LSOAs
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in England and Wales, of which 34,374 have at least one transaction in the
Land Registry dataset. Postcode sectors (PS) are aggregations of actual post-
codes devised for mail sorting purposes. On average a postcode sector con-
tains 2,995 households housing 7,272 people. There are 8,464 postcode sectors
with at least one transaction in the Land Registry dataset. Postcode districts
are aggregations of postcode sectors. There are roughly 2,900 postcode dis-
tricts in the UK and 2,345 postcode districts with positive sales in my Land
Registry dataset.
3 The UK Housing Market
In the late 80s rising mortgage rates and a worsening of labour market con-
ditions affected affordability (Jowsey (2011)) in UK housing markets. The re-
sulting contraction in demand put downward pressure on prices which fell
between 1990 and 1995.
Home prices started to increase again after 1997 and continued to rise up
to November of 2007, the month in which the Land Registry’s Repeat sales
index hit its maximum for the 1995-2013 period. The rapid growth in prices,
particularly between 2004 and 2007, was often interpreted as evidence of a
housing bubble in UK markets, in parallel to bubbles in other economies such
as the US or Spain.
Figure II shows the series of de-seasonalized housing transactions for the
1995-2013 period. Before the financial crisis, the monthly number of home
sales increased from around 70,000 in 1995 to 100,000 after 1998 and then os-
cillated around this figure until the last quarter of 2007.
After a brief period of stagnation house prices began to drop steadily and
by April 2009 the Land Registry’s index reached its trough. This supposed a
17% drop in nominal home prices (20.4% in real terms). Simultaneously, 2008
saw a fast decrease in transaction volumes: December 2008 recorded 51% less
housing purchases than the same month in 2007.
More than six years after the bust started, prices and transactions have
not fully recovered. While this may be attributed to the existence of a bubble
before 2007, this explanation seems unlikely to fit the protracted stagnation
in transaction volumes. In 2013, yearly sales were still lower than in every
year between 1997 and 2007. The analysis bellow shows that this reduction in
transactions was not neutral across different segments of the housing ladder.
In addition, it provides some insights into why transactions have remained so
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FIGURE II
EVOLUTION OF TRANSACTIONS AND PRICES
Data for England and Wales. Left vertical axis corresponds to transactions and right vertical
axis corresponds to prices. Number of transactions in thousands. The price index is the
repeat-sales index built by the Land Registry (base set to June 2003).
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low.
Regarding trends in housing tenure, the 1981-2001 period saw an increase
in home-ownership from 59% to 69%. This increase has been related to the
relaxation of credit conditions by several studies (see Muellbauer and Mur-
phy (1997), Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1999), Stephens, Whitehead and Munro
(2005)). However, in 2001 the rate of home-ownership started to fall at the
expense of private renting. Between 2002 and 2008, the percentage of homes
living as renters increased from 10% to 12.8% , mainly through increases in
purchases by home-owners for investment purposes. Renting increased faster
during the crisis, going from 12.8% to 16.4% in 2012, a change that has often
been attributed to tighter credit conditions.
3.1 Mortgage Markets
Following the de-regulation of mortgage markets in the early eighties,5 the
UK witnessed a proliferation of high Loan-to-Value (LTV) mortgages. The left
panel in Figure III shows that the availability of high LTV ratio mortgages
that started in 1982 was sustained for decades. During this period, the typical
FTB could buy a home by paying a deposit of 10% of the total home value
and obtain a loan on the remaining 90%.6 With the advent of the financial
crisis median LTVs for this group decreased abruptly from 90% in early 2007
to roughly 75% by 2009.
This change in median was the result of a broader change in the whole
distribution of LTVs. The right panel of Figure III, shows how the cumula-
tive distribution of mortgage LTVs to first-time buyers changed between 2006
and 2009. We can see that much of the mass of the distribution shifted to
the left. between 2007 and 2009 By 2009 more than 90% of the cumulative
frequency of lending to first time buyers corresponded to LTVs of less than
90%. High loan-to-value mortgages, which had been typical for years, all but
disappeared from the market between 2008 and 2009.
The change in LTV ratios increased the deposit required to FTBs apply-
ing for a mortgage. The Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML) estimated that
5The deregulation brought about in 1986 first by the Housing Societies Act and next by
the ’Big Bang’ in the City’s financial markets expanded the availability of mortgage credit to
unprecedented levels.
6Evidence from the Wealth and Assets Survey and the Survey of Building Society Mort-
gages show that first-time-buyers are the group taking up the largest LTV mortgages. This is
a consequence of the fact that they have lower accumulated wealth and hence are less capable
of paying large deposits.
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FIGURE III
LOAN-TO-VALUE RATIOS
Left: Vertical axis plots the median Loan-to-Value ratio on mortgages granted to first-time
buyers in percentage and the horizontal axis plots years. Graph extracted from Kuvshinov
(2010). Original data from Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML). Right: Cumulative distribu-
tions of LTVs for First Time Buyers for years 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009. (Source: CML).
the typical FTB deposit increased from 12,700 to 32,300 pounds between early
2007 and early 2010. To put this change into perspective note that this implies
a change from 37% to 100% of annual individual income (CML estimates).
Many young households became unable to meet the necessary down-payment
and were, as a result, excluded from home-ownership. In the years after the
bust, the size of the required deposit has often been cited as the main barrier
to buying a home by households seeking to jump on the property ladder (see
Blackwell and Park (2011), LSL First-Time Buyer Barometer (2014)).
Evidence from the Bank of England Credit Conditions Survey (CCS) indi-
cates that this change in lending was partly supply driven. Respondents re-
ported a reduction in maximum offered loan-to-value ratios after the last quar-
ter of 2007. The CCS indicates that part of this change was attributed to the
tightening of wholesale funding conditions and changes in the economic out-
look although, admittedly, housing price expectations also played a role.
Another element which have affected availability of high LTV mortgages
could be the anticipation of regulatory changes. During 2008, following the
demise of Northern Rock, the Financial Services Authority announced it would
modify reserve requirements for banks. Moreover, in early 2009, it announced
it would accelerate the adoption of so-called Basel 2.5 regulation, which changed
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the risk weighting of high LTV products in the computation of banks’ capital
requirements. Even though all of these changes were rolled out progressively,
it is clear that the soft-touch approach to banking regulation took a serious
blow during 2007/2008.7 In anticipation of actual changes, banks may have
also changed lending patterns. This is consistent with evidence from the CCS
indicating that changes in banks’ appetite for risk affected high LTV lending.
In the analysis below, I treat the change in credit availability as exogenous
from the point of view of individual households.
4 Stylized Fact: The Bust by Home Qualities
In this section I study how different homes and neighbourhoods within Travel-
to-Work-Areas fared during the crisis. In particular, I study how prices and
transactions fell for homes of different quality levels.
I find that the peak-trough change in house prices between 2007 and 2009
was similar for low and high quality homes, with some heterogeneity across
cities. Regarding transactions I find that there was a clear change in the com-
position of home sales during 2008: while transactions fell across most seg-
ments, they fell the most in cheap, young markets. This implies that homes in
these markets took up a smaller share of total transactions than in the bench-
mark period. This change in composition is observed in the 10 largest TTWAs
and in the vast majority of smaller ones. As a consequence, it appears to be
the result of an aggregate shock affecting England and Wales.
After documenting the change in the composition of home sales I study
its timing. Findings indicate that the differential change in the evolution of
transactions for cheap and expensive homes occurred during mid and late
2008. This change coincides in time with the tightening of credit conditions
and the increase in deposit requirements discussed above.
In order to study how homes of different qualities fared in the market dur-
ing the crisis I first need a workable definition of quality that can be applied to
my transaction data. I will define the quality of a home as a fixed, unobserv-
able attribute which is desirable for households seeking to reside in a home
and will hence be positively correlated with prices in equilibrium. Note that
I am not seeking to estimate quality as a structural parameter in household
7Lord Adair Turner, chief of the FSA in 2008, eloquently declared ’the days of light-touch
regulation in the City are over’.
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preferences but rather to obtain a ranking of homes in terms of this unobserv-
able trait.
For this purpose suppose price for a home i sold in quarter t can be de-
composed as follows:
pit = δ
TTWA
it + αi + ξit.
Where pit is the logarithm of the transaction price, δTTWAt is a set of (TTWA
specific) time dummies. The error term ξit captures random variation in the
transaction price that is not fixed or home specific (e.g.: specific to the buyer-
seller match). Quality is defined as αi and is fixed and unobservable. The
challenge is to obtain an estimate for this parameter and use it to rank homes
by it. For this purpose I propose two methods, both of them inspired in the
house price index literature.
4.1 Home Groups
The first method uses data on type of dwelling (detached, semi-detached, ter-
race, flat) and/or location to group homes and then takes mean prices within
these groups as proxies for αi. In using this information I follow the spirit of
hedonic or spatial house price indices which use homes characteristics to elim-
inate changes in the composition of sales (see Hill (2012) for a survey). Loca-
tion and home types are important determinants of home prices and explain
a large fraction of their cross-sectional variance. Moreover, location-dwelling
type groups have stable price rankings within each TTWA (see Section 5). Both
of these conditions make them reasonable proxies for αi.
Formally, the method proceeds by estimating the following specification
by OLS:
pit = δ
TTWA
it + µj + ξit.
Again pit corresponds to the log of price for home i sold at quarter t. Pa-
rameter µj is a dummy for location or location-type group j, δTTWAit is a set of
city specific time effects and ξit is an error term. The purpose is to use esti-
mated values of µ̂j as proxies for quality in each group j. Once I obtain µ̂j , I
compute how transactions and prices changed between 2007 and 2009 across
different groups. Finally, I compare these figures with the groups’ ranking
in the quality distribution. In this way, I document the relationship between
quality and the fall in prices and transactions.
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As an initial example I focus on the case of the London TTWA and group
homes by postcode district. There are roughly 270 postcode districts in this
metropolitan areas and fixed effects at this level explain 77% of the cross sec-
tional variance in log prices for London. Once I estimate µ̂j I split into post-
code districts into estimated quintiles. I do the same for the change in trans-
actions and the change in average prices at the postcode district level. In both
cases the change is taken over the 2007 and 2009 periods.
I illustrate these results in the map shown in Figure IV. The upper panel
displays a map of London’s postcode districts in which darker shades of red
correspond to higher quality (more expensive) districts. Unsurprisingly, we
observe that central London and the South West are high quality areas whereas
the East is cheaper. In the middle panel I portray the change in transactions in
each district with darker shades of blue corresponding to larger decreases in
the number of sales in 2009 relative to 2007. Finally, the bottom panel displays
the change in prices for each area with darker shades of green corresponding
to stronger drops in transactions.
The comparison between the maps is illustrative of the stylized fact docu-
mented in this paper. Comparing the top and middle panels we can observe
that places with higher quality (dark red) correspond to moderate reductions
in transactions (light blue in the middle panel). Take, for example, the case
of central London and the South West. In both cases we observe a corridor
of high quality - moderate reductions in transactions. The converse happens
in the East London. The picture for prices is less clear. In the third panel we
observe that several districts in the South West rank high in the distribution of
price reductions. The correlation between price drops and low quality is only
clear in the east and less so than in the case of transactions.
I now turn to a more refined analysis, combining more disaggregate lo-
cation information with information on dwelling types in my estimation of
quality. For this purpose I define groups at the postcode sector - dwelling
type level. A postcode sector dwelling-type group identifies a type of home in
a specific location.8 A total of 36,085 postcode sector - dwelling type (PS-DT)
groups had at least one sale during the 1997-2007 period. I now re-estimate
the price equation above using this definition of groups. Parameter µj now
corresponds to a PS-DT dummy for group j.
I use the estimated values at this detailed level of disaggregation and ob-
8For example: detached homes in postcode sector E1 4, semi-detached homes in postcode
sector WC2A 2 or detached homes in postcode sector CV4 7.
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FIGURE IV
POSTCODE DISTRICTS IN LONDON TTWA
14
tain µ̂j as proxies for quality in each group j. The estimation of only uses data
on the benchmark period in order to avoid possible changes in relative prices
after 2008.9 For all PS-DT pairs having positive sales in 2007 and 2009 I com-
pute the percent difference in mean prices between peak (2007) and trough
(2009) as well as the difference in average yearly transactions between both
years. Figure V plots these differences against the within-TTWA rank of esti-
mated quality. I estimate bivariate kernel densities over the data and report
their contour plots for ease of interpretation.
The change in prices is shown in the top panel. We can see that the change
in prices was on average negative as expected, and that it was fairly homoge-
neous across qualities. The correlation on the kernel density estimate appears
close to 0 or slightly positive. In order to further explore this I divide homes
into high and low quality by splitting them with respect to the TTWA-specific
median and estimate price indexes for each of these groups. After their peak
in late 2007, prices fell for both groups to their lowest level in 2009. The fall
was not quite symmetric, the index low homes fell by 18% while the one for
high homes fell by 16%. Still, the difference is rather modest and masks sub-
stantial heterogeneity between cities.
Turning to transactions, the bottom panel of Figure V displays a visible
positive correlation: the percentage drop in transactions was lower for homes
higher up in the quality distribution with the correlation being roughly 17%.
The pattern is observed consistently in the vast majority of TTWAs including
the 10 largest ones. The fact that the number of transactions fell more for
lower quality homes implies a change in composition: the fraction of total
transactions corresponding to them was reduced after 2008.
Alternatively, I estimate the change in prices and transactions for different
location-type groups by estimating the following specifications using OLS and
data for years 2007 and 2009 only:
log(price)jt = β
price
1 rankj + β
price
2 rankj∆Postt + η
price
t + 
price
jt
transjt = β
trans
1 rankj + β
trans
2 rankj∆Postt + η
trans
t + 
trans
jt
The dependent variables log(price)jt and transactionsjt correspond to the
logarithm of the mean price and the the number of transactions for group j
9The period over which this proxy is estimated (benchmark, crisis or both) does not affect
the results.
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FIGURE V
CHANGE IN PRICES AND TRANSACTIONS BY QUALITY
Postcode Sector - Dwelling Type Pairs
Top: plots the change in prices between 2007 and 2009 against the within-TTWA quality rank.
Bottom: plots the change in yearly transactions between and 2009 periods against the within-
TTWA quality rank. In both cases the unit is the postcode sector-dwelling type pairs with
positive sales in both years. The figure plots the contour plot of an Normal kernel density
estimate with bandwidth chosen according to Silverman’s rule-of-thumb.
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in year t, respectively.10 In both cases the variables are normalized so that the
relevant coefficient can be interpreted in terms of 2007 standard deviations of
the dependent variable. Variable Postt is a dummy taking value 1 in 2009. The
coefficients of interest in this context are βprice2 and βtrans2 which measure the
respective changes in the slopes of the quality-price and quality-transactions
relationships. Results from estimating these specifications are reported in Ta-
ble II.
TABLE II
STYLIZED FACT - QUALITY ESTIMATED BY GROUPS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(price) log(price) trans trans
Quality Rank*Post 0.0671*** 0.0671*** 0.498*** 0.811***
[0.0131] [0.0185] [0.0216] [0.0346]
Quality Rank 3.180*** -0.546***
[0.0161] [0.0337]
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time TTWA Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Obs. 48442 48442 53067 53067
In columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is the normalized logarithm of mean prices.
The mean in prices is taken within each group and the normalization amounts to dividing the
variable by the within TTWA standard deviation. In columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable
is the logarithm of transactions plus one. Columns 1 and 3 are estimated via OLS including
city-year dummies. Columns 2 and 4 are fixed effects panel regressions at the location-type
level including city-year effects. Standard errors are clustered at the postcode district level.
The coefficients of interest βprice2 and βtrans2 are presented in the first row of
Table II in specifications 1 through 3 and 4 through 6 respectively. We can see
that in all cases the coefficients are positive and significant. A coefficient of
0.067 in column 3 indicates that the log price of homes of the highest quality
increased there difference with the log price of homes of the lowest quality
in 0.067 standard deviations after 2009. Meanwhile, the coefficient 0.811 in
10The fact that I consider the log of prices and not the log of transactions is motivated by the
fact that transactions is a count variable which often takes value 0. An alternative specification
involving a transformation of log transactions variable to ensure it exists for 0 values yields
similar results.
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column 6 indicates that the number of transactions for homes of the highest
quality increased their difference with the number of transactions in the lower
end of the market in 0.811 standard deviations. Note that 0.811 is more than
10 times larger than 0.067 so while there was a slight increase in the differ-
ence in prices between the lower and higher ends of the market in 2009 the
difference in transaction volumes between both groups changed much more.
This is another expression of the stylized fact documented above. While the
fall in prices between 2007 and 2009 was fairly similar for homes of different
qualities transactions fell much more in the lower end of the market.
Other coefficients reported in Table II indicate that the specifications are
also reproducing the broad facts in other dimensions. First, the time effect in
columns 2 and 5 are strongly negative and significant, reproducing the fall in
both prices and transactions between 2007 and 2009. Secondly, quality rank
correlates strongly with prices in column 1.
4.2 Repeat-Sales
The second method used to estimate home qualities is inspired by the repeat-
sales method proposed initially by Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963) and pop-
ularized after Case and Shiller (1989). For this purpose I focus on the sub-
sample of units which have been sold at least twice between 1995 and 2013.
Having more than one sale allows me to estimate quality from historical sell-
ing prices at the home level. To do so I estimate pit = piTTWAt +αi + ξit by fixed
effects to obtain an estimate for αi. I next use this noisy estimates to compute
deciles of the αi distribution for each TTWA and classify homes using these
estimated deciles. Finally, I compute the change in transactions and prices for
each of these groups. Results are presented in Figure VI.
The results are qualitatively the same as those obtained estimating qual-
ity using postcode sector-dwelling type groups. The peak-trough change in
prices across the quality distribution (pictured on the top panel) shows no
clear pattern and is fairly homogeneous. On the other hand, transactions (pic-
tured on the bottom panel) fell more for relatively lower quality homes, con-
firming the change in composition discussed above. In addition, this shift is
present in the overwhelming majority of TTWAs.
Both methods yield similar result so I conclude that during the crisis trans-
action volumes where on average lower for low quality homes. But was this
specific to the changes in demand and supply between 2007 and 2009? To
answer this question I construct a panel of PS-DT pairs at the quarterly fre-
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FIGURE VI
CHANGE IN PRICES AND TRANSACTIONS BY QUALITY
Repeat-Sales Method
Top: Change in average prices between Q4 2007 and Q2 2009 (peak and trough of the aggre-
gate price index series) for within-TTWA quality deciles. Bottom: Average change in yearly
transactions between the benchmark (1995-2007) and crisis (2008-2013) periods for within-
TTWA quality deciles. Quality estimated at the level of individual homes in the repeat-sales
sample.
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FIGURE VII
CORRELATION BETWEEN QUALITY AND TRANSACTIONS
Plot of the cross-sectional correlation between estimated quality and the number of transac-
tions for each semester between 2000 and 2013. Units are the 36,085 PS-DT pairs with positive
sales in the 1997-2007 period.
quency. For each pair I estimate quality using the method outlined above and
then I calculate the correlation between quality and the number of transactions
for every quarter. The correlations are plotted in figure VII.
We can see that over the 2000-2007 period, the correlation between qual-
ity of traded homes and transactions was relatively stable around 0. We can
clearly see that correlations increase abruptly in late 2008 and oscillated around
-0.025 thereafter. The timing of this shift largely coincides with the change
in borrowing conditions in UK credit markets. While, admittedly, this time-
series evidence is not conclusive, it is consistent with the hypothesis that the
stylized fact was related to the increase in LTVs.
5 Robustness
In this section I discuss the robustness of the empirical analysis in the previ-
ous section. First, I show that my estimates of quality are stable over time: a
home which has a high estimated quality in one period is very likely to have
a high price when sold again, which amounts to validating my quality mea-
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sures. Next, I restrict my definition of quality to dwelling type and compare
the highest quality type (detached homes) with the lowest quality type (ter-
raced homes). Studying how these homes fared during the crisis confirms the
results obtained for more refined definitions of quality. Finally, I report that
the findings above are robust to the inclusion of leaseholds and new-builds in
the dataset.
Quality is defined above as a fixed attribute of a home. However, it is
clear that the price a home may seek in the market at different times may
differ substantially. It be remodelled or upgraded, its neighbourhood may
change its composition, become gentrified or enter a phase of decay. Hence,
the assumption that quality is (approximately) fixed is not trivial. In order
to evaluate whether it is adequate I compute quality estimates for the same
home for different time periods. I then check whether these estimates fall in
similar places of the cross sectional quality distribution.
In the case of my hedonic method I estimate quality for Postcode Sector-
Dwelling type pairs for three time periods: 1998-2002, 2003-2007 and 2008-
2012. Next I construct diagrams comparing quality estimates in these periods.
Results are presented in Figure VIII. They show the rank correlation plots for
estimated qualities for estimated in 2003-2007 and 1998-2002 (top-left), 2008-
2012 and 2003-2007 (top-right), and 2008-2012 and 1998-2002 (bottom). In all
cases the estimated correlation is larger than 0.9. This indicates that quali-
ties estimated using this method are stable and that the assumption of fixed
quality is reasonable for the period under consideration.
A similar analysis can be performed for the repeat-sales method. Given
that in this case the method requires that a home is sold at least twice to obtain
an estimate of its quality I consider estimated qualities obtained over only two
periods: (1998-2005) and (2006-2013). The correlation between quality ranks
is again high (0.90) and I interpret this as validating my repeat-sales method.
In order to show the salience of the stylized fact in Section 4 I now consider
a much simpler definition of quality: dwelling type. Detached and Terraced
homes combined amounted to over 65% of all transacted dwellings since 2000.
These types have, respectively, the highest and lowest average prices in most
markets. I consider these two groups of homes and track the evolution of their
share of total sales volumes as well as their prices.
Results are presented in Figure IX. In the left panel we can see that the
price indices for both dwelling types followed each other quite closely after
the beginning of 2008. Terraced homes prices fell by 15.1% between late 2007
and mid 2009. The price drop for detached homes was slightly more modest
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FIGURE VIII
QUALITY RANK CORRELATIONS
Postcode Sector - Dwelling Type Pairs
Rank correlation plots of the quality estimates for periods (1998-2002), (2003-2007) and (2008-
2012). Qualities estimated estimated at the level of PS-DT pairs. Top-Left: Rank correlation
plot for quality estimated in (2003-2007) and (1998-2002). Top-Right: Rank correlation plot for
quality estimated in (2008-2012) and (2003-2007). Bottom: Rank correlation plot for quality
estimated in (2008-2012) and (1998-2002).
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FIGURE IX
DETACHED AND TERRACED HOMES
Left: Evolution of prices for detached and Terraced homes. Normalized to 100 at Q1 2008.
Price indices constructed using repeat-sales methodology. Right: Fraction of total transactions
corresponding to detached and terraced homes.
FIGURE X
INCLUDING NEWBUILDS AND LEASEHOLDS
Postcode Sector - Dwelling Type Pairs
Plot of the change in yearly transactions between 2007 and 2009 periods against the within-
TTWA quality rank. The unit in both cases is the postcode sector-dwelling type pair. The
figure plots the contour plot of an Normal kernel density estimate with bandwidth chosen
according to Silverman’s rule-of-thumb. Leaseholds and newbuilds included.
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(13.6%). This change is similar to the one documented above for more pre-
cise definitions of quality. Regarding transactions (right panel), the fraction
of sales corresponding to each type changed abruptly during 2008. Detached
homes increased their share of total sales by four percentage points, roughly
the decrease in the fraction corresponding to terraced dwellings. Again, this
is consistent with the differential fall in transactions documented in Section 4.
In my transactions sample I have excluded information on newbuilds and
leashold transactions. Given that leasehold records do not include the lease
term, I cannot use information on prices to construct the quality proxies. In
the case of newbuilds, all information can be used. Figure X is analogous to the
plot presented in the bottom panel of Figure V but including these two types
of transactions. As we can see, the qualitative picture is the same: average
yearly transactions after 2008 fell more for relatively lower quality homes.
6 Model: Housing Ladder, Credit Constraints and
Renting
In this section I present an overlapping generations model of the housing lad-
der that reproduces the observations discussed above. In the model, tighter
credit constraints lead to a different composition of sales and a larger stock of
households living as renters. I show how including the possibility of buy-to-
let and let-to-buy can provide scope for changes in the composition of trans-
acted homes.11
The analysis is restricted to comparative statics around steady state values
for transaction volumes and renting. This suffices to emphasize the pricing
out of young buyers by older households mainly through the let-to-buy chan-
nel, a phenomenon that has been labelled by the press as the emergence of
’accidental landlords’. Given that transition dynamics are ignored, the effect
of lock-in on indebted households (a mechanism emphasized in Stein (1995)
or Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006)) is not included in the model. However, the
role of lock-in in affecting the composition of sales is discussed in Section 8.
Depending on parameter values the model can accommodate several dif-
ferent lifetime tenure transitions. Below, I consider a particular configura-
tion in which i) the poorest young agents live with their parents ii) the richest
11Recall a but-to-let transaction happens when an agent buys a low type home as an invest-
ment. Let-to-buy happens when an agent trades up the ladder and rents out the low home
where she resided when young.
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young agents live in high quality homes iii) old households who lived with
their parents when young are renters when old, iv) only old households can
be landlords. This configuration contains both but-to-let and let-to-buy. In
addition, it is broadly consistent with lifetime tenure transitions and of home
ownership by age.
6.1 Setup
Consider an overlapping generations economy in which agents live for two
periods. Every period a mass 1 of households is born and a mass 1 of house-
holds dies, so at the end of each period population is constant and equal to
2. There is a fixed stock of housing units S = SL + SH with SL and SH be-
ing the stock of low and high type dwellings respectively. Below I assume
S < 2 which ensures positive rental prices. Households have preferences over
housing and consumption. Their lifetime utility function is given by:
u(c, h) = (cy + βco)hohy
Consumption when young is given by cy and consumption when old by
co, the consumption good being the numeraire (pc = 1). Utility depends on
housing through hy and ho which take values φ when living with the parents,
1 when living in a type L home and ψ when living in a type H home, with
φ < 1 < ψ. Second period consumption is discounted by factor β. Households
have an exogenous source of income ei which they receive every period. In-
comes are heterogeneous with ei ∼ G(e) within cohorts with G(e) continuous
with positive support in an interval [eL, eH ]. Income can be used for consump-
tion, to buy homes or to pay for rent.
All households are born without a home. They can buy one in the property
market by paying a price determined endogenously in equilibrium. Prices for
low and high homes in period t are respectively P tL and P
t
L. After buying a
home, households can enjoy the utility of residing there as owner-occupiers.
Alternatively, they can act as landlords and rent out a low type home they
own in exchange for a rent Rt.12 Households who do not own a dwelling can
become tenants and reside in a low type home for one period by paying rent.
For simplicity, no household can own more that two homes at a time and only
one home can be bought per period.
12For simplicity, only low type homes can be rented. This simplification is justified by the
fact that the bulk of renting is concentrated in cheap homes: more than two third of rented
homes had values below the median in 2008 (source: English Housing Survey).
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When buying a dwelling households can borrow at the exogenous interest
rate r which is also the rate paid for savings. I assume that assume r ≤ 1− β
β
.
Credit constraints in the model through an exogenous borrowing limit: agents
can borrow up to γ units so that buying a home of type j requires a down-
payment P jt − γ. There is no default on debt.13
Timing is as follows. i) At the beginning of any period t, a mass 1 of house-
holds is born, ii) households born at t and t − 1 receive income ei, iii) the
housing market opens. Agents born at t and t − 1 can either buy, sell or rent
a home, agents who where born in t − 2 can sell their homes, iv) agents born
at t − 2 choose co and die, iv) hy and ho accrue for agents born at t and t − 1
respectively, given their residence. iv) young households choose cy and the
period ends.
Note that at the beginning of each period agents born at t − 2, t − 1 and
t coexist. Nonetheless, agents born at t − 2 limit themselves to selling in the
housing market before passing away so the effective demand for housing will
have mass 2. Agents can save between periods at interest rate r.
In this context households solve their inter-temporal optimization problem
choosing residence, whether to buy a second home and consumption. Prefer-
ences shown above, I can assume without loss of generality that cy = 0. As a
consequence, all consumption takes place immediately before exiting. While
this is an unrealistic prediction for lifetime consumption, it greatly simplifies
the analysis and ensures that proofs can be obtained analytically. This simplifi-
cation of inter-temporal consumption choices is also present in Ortalo-Magne
and Rady (2006).
I will restrict my attention to comparing steady states with different values
of γ such that:
P tL = PL, P
t
H = PH and R
t = R ∀t
Steady-States
As argued above, I restrict my attention to allocations of the form presented
in Figure XI.
The relevant thresholds determining housing tenure decisions are given by
13See Banerjee and Newman (1993) for a micro-foundation. The additive constraint implies
that a reduction in credit has a stronger effect on borrowing capacity for young buyers who
have low wealth and, on the margin, a larger loan to wealth ratio.
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FIGURE XI
EQUILIBRIUM CONFIGURATION
eL eH
Age 1
θyR θ
y
L θ
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H
∅ R L H
eL eH
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θoL θ
o
H θ
o
HL
R L H HL
θ s. Notation is as follows: θyL is the threshold which over which young agents
can afford a low home. Likewise, θoHL is the threshold over which old agents
can afford both a high and a low home.
Young households live with their parents if their income is below a thresh-
old θyR. This threshold is determined by the trade off between foregone con-
sumption from paying rent and the extra utility derived from residing in a
type L home. Its closed form solution (see Appendix 1) is:
θyR =
(2 + r)− φ
(2 + r)(1− φ)R
Note that some agents who would be able to afford a rent (ei ≥ R) choose
not to do so in order not to forgo consumption.14 This threshold does not
depend directly on prices of high or low type homes and will determine the
rental rate as long as the rental market exists (see below).
Young households rent if θyR < ei < θ
y
L. Threshold θ
y
L is determined solely
by affordability as long as home ownership is worth the lost interest income
(rPL < (1 + r)R). This implies that θ
y
L = PL − γ. Note that if PL < γ all agents
would be able to buy a low type home and, given that S < 2, the market
would not clear. Likewise, if PL − γ < R no agents would rent.
Finally, threshold θyH determines which households buy a high home when
young. It can be determined either by the credit constraint or by the trade-off
between the lost interest income and the extra utility from residing in a high
type home. As argued in Appendix 1, for high values of ψ the affordability
constraint is binding for the marginal agent so that θyH = PH − γ.
14To see this note that for positive values of φ and r
(2 + r)− φ
(2 + r)(1− φ) > 1 so θ
y
R > R
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Given these threshold values it is straightforward to note that period 1
demands are given by:
DR1 = G(θ
y
L)−G(θyR)
DL1 = G(θ
y
H)−G(θyL)
DH1 = 1−G(θyH)
The case of housing demands for agents born in t − 1 is slightly different
because accumulated wealth is larger for these agents and all thresholds de-
pend on previous choices. The thresholds θoL, θ
o
H and θ
o
HL, are determined by
the second period credit constraint. The required down-payments are PL − γ,
PH − γ and PH + PL − γ for agents owning a low type home, a high type
home and both a low and a high type home, respectively. Given these deposit
requirements and previous period choices, the relevant thresholds θoL, θ
o
H and
θoHL are determined (see Appendix 1). The demands for renting and owner
occupation at age 2 will then be given by:
DR2 = G(θ
o
L)
DL2 = G(θ
o
H)−G(θoL)
DH2 = 1−G(θoH)
Rent supply is given by agents born at t − 1 that own two homes at time t.
Given the thresholds above, rent supply is given by: SR = 1−G(θoHL).
Equilibrium conditions are given by market clearing in the L and H mar-
kets together with the condition that the number of agents living with their
parents is equal to the difference between the population and the number of
homes.
DL1 +D
L
2 + S
R = SL
DH1 +D
H
2 = SH
G(θyR) = 2− SL − SH
28
The third equation pins down R in terms of model parameters. Renting
does not depend on credit constraints and is pinned down by a market clear-
ing condition: the number of agents living with their parents must be equal
to the difference between population and the housing stock 2− SL − SH . The
marginal agent is indifferent between renting and not renting, agents with
higher ei rent.
Re-writing the market clearing conditions for high and low type homes in
terms of the relevant thresholds we are left with:
G(θyH)−G(θyL) +G(θoH)−G(θoL) + 1−G(θoHL) = SL (1)
1−G(θyH) + 1−G(θoH) = SH (2)
It is clear from these equations that no closed form solution for prices and
transaction volumes can be obtained unless distribution G(.) is replaced for
a suitable cdf. Nonetheless, some of the stylized facts presented in sections
3 and 4 can be obtained for a general distribution function. These results are
summarized in proposition 1.
Proposition 1
In configurations characterized by θyR < θ
o
L < θ
y
L < θ
o
H < θ
o
HL < θ
y
H , steady states
with lower γ have i) lower values of trL − trH and ii) higher values of SR.
Both statements in Proposition 1 are related. Transactions of low type
homes every period are given by purchases by first-time buyers, purchases
by agents born in t − 1 who rented when young and purchases by let-to-buy
landlords. Adding the mass in each of these groups I can write transactions
of low homes in steady state as trL = 1 − G(θoL)15. Likewise the number of
transactions for high type homes is trH = 1 − G(θoHL). The first statement of
Proposition 1 requires that:
dtrL
dγ
>
dtrH
dγ
The mass of renters is equal to the supply of rental housing in equilibrium
SR so that the second statement of Proposition 1 requires
dSR
dγ
< 0.
15Note that purchases by first-time buyers are (G(θyH)−G(θyL), purchases by agents born in
t−1 who rented when young are (G(θyL)) and purchases by let-to-buy landlords are (1−G(θyH))
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The proof proceeds by contradiction after substituting the thresholds val-
ues for the expressions presented above and deriving the equilibrium condi-
tions with respect to γ (see Appendix 1).
Intuitively, a higher borrowing limit implies higher prices in the low mar-
ket while leaving rents unaffected. As a result the number of old households
able to buy a low type home as an investment decreases. Insofar as
dPL
dγ
< 1,
an increase in γ reduces the stock of renters. Transactions of low type homes
increase with loose credit as less households retain their homes when trading
up.
The opposite happens with tighter credit. Prices for low type homes PL
are lower as young, low income agents are unable to meet down-payment
constraints. Given that rents do not depend on γ and that prices are lower,
more old agents are able to buy two homes and rent one out. This happens
through increases in let-to-buy transitions and reduces trL.
A corollary implicit in the argument above is that, in steady states with
tighter credit, let-to-buy becomes relatively more important than buy-to-let.
Corollary
In steady states with tighter credit the mass of buy-to-let landlords is lower and the
mass of let-to-buy landlords higher.
Define btl as the mass of households who became landlords through buy-
to-let and ltb as the mass of households who became landlords through let-to-
buy. The proof of this Corollary requires showing that
dbtl
dγ
> 0 and
dltb
dγ
< 0.
As before, the proof proceeds by contradiction using equations (1) and (2) (see
Appendix 1). The Corollary is important because it solves the puzzle of in-
creased renting in a context of strong decreases in buy-to-let lending observed
over the past few years in the UK. Moreover, it yields some of the testable
implications presented below (see Section 7).
To sum up, the simple model with credit constraints matches observed
changes in the UK housing market after credit tightening during 2008: an
increase in the number of renters, a change in the composition of home sales,
a decrease in buy-to-let and an increase in let-to-buy. The change in steady
state allocations of homes is illustrated in Figure XII.
The next section presents evidence in support of this mechanism. Section 8
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FIGURE XII
EQUILIBRIUM CONFIGURATION FOR γ′ < γ
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tests alternative explanations that could potentially generate predictions sim-
ilar to those delivered by the model.
7 Supporting Evidence
In the model, credit tightening increases renting by the young. These agents
are priced out of the ownership market by older/wealthier households who
keep their homes when trading up. In this section I present evidence in sup-
port of this mechanism. On the first place, I show that the reduction in trans-
action volumes was stronger in areas where renting increased. This indicates
that the rise in the number of rented dwellings was not supplied through in-
creases in buy-to-let but rather through let-and-buy transitions. Moreover,
as predicted by the model, buy-to let lending decreased significantly during
2008. Secondly, I show that there was also an age pattern in the fall in trans-
actions with sales falling more in relatively young neighbourhoods. This re-
inforces the idea that it was homes typically bought by FTBs that experienced
the strongest reduction in trades.
Finally, I show that the decrease in the correlation between transactions
and renting on the one hand and the increase in the correlation between age
and transactions on the other both appeared during late 2008 and early 2009,
coinciding with the change in LTVs.
Evidence from the Rental Market
The evolution of the fraction of people living as renters is illustrated in the
left panel of Figure XIII. This fraction increased from 12.8% in 2008 to 16.4%
in 2012. In light of the proposition stated above I interpret this change as a
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FIGURE XIII
RENTAL MARKET
Left: Percentage of homes occupied through private rental. Vertical line corresponds to 2008.
Source: English Housing Survey. Right: Number of buy-to-let loans (in thousands) dis-
tributed to UK households over the 2003-2012 period. Source: CML.
consequence of the tightening of credit conditions. But where did this extra
supply of rented homes come from? As shown in the right panel of Figure
XIII, the number of buy-to-let loans dropped abruptly after 2007. Hence, it
is unlikely that buy-to-let could provide the supply to house the new renting
households.
The Corollary presented in section 6 provides a clear answer to this ques-
tion. In the model, buy-to-let is lower when credit is tighter, a prediction
broadly consistent with the data. The extra supply of rental homes in steady
states with tighter credit comes from increases in let-to-buy; old households
keeping their previous home when trading up. This yields a testable predic-
tion: in areas where renting increased more, transactions should have experi-
enced a larger fall. It is straightforward to test this prediction.
In the 2001 and 2011 censuses UK households were asked about their cur-
rent housing tenure. This information is available at the LSOA level and it
divides homes into owner-occupiers, social renters and private renters. I use
this information to compute the increase in the fraction of private renters over
the 2001-2011 period. Given that my model predicts more renting through let-
to-buy transitions in steady states with tighter credit, I expect the increase in
renting between 2001 and 2011 to be negatively correlated with transactions.16
16As shown in Section 3, most of the increase in renting over this period took place after
2008. Moreover, the increase in renting between 2002 and 2008 was mainly fuelled by pur-
chases by buy-to-let investors which should not have a negative effect on transactions.
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FIGURE XIV
CHANGE IN RENTING AND THE FALL IN TRANSACTIONS
The figure plots the drop in average yearly transactions at the LSOA level in the vertical axis
against the increase in the fraction of renters over total households between 2001 and 2011 in
the horizontal axis. 29,942 LSOAs in total. The slope of the fitted linear equation is -1.05 and is
significant at conventional levels. An increase of one standard deviation in ∆ renting implies
a decrease of 0.34 standard deviations in the change in transactions.
The corresponding scatter plot is presented in Figure XIV.
While this is suggestive of the mechanism outlined above it may be a con-
sequence of the fact that renting is concentrated in areas with low quality
housing. In order to estimate the sign of this correlation after controlling for
other factors I consider the following specification:
∆transj = β1∆Rentj +BXj + j
Where ∆transj is the proportional change in transactions between the bench-
mark and crisis periods in LSOA j, ∆Rentj is the increase in the fraction of
renters in the crisis period and Xj is a vector of controls. The controls may in-
clude the estimated home quality at the LSOA level, the change in the number
of benefit claimants (a measure of deprivation in the area) and the change in
job seekers during the crisis as well as TTWA fixed effects.
The resulting estimates are presented in Table III. Across specifications we
observe that the coefficient on ∆Rentj is negative and significant. The second
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TABLE III
CHANGE IN RENTING AND TRANSACTIONS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆transjt ∆transjt ∆transjt ∆transjt
∆ Renters -0.336*** -0.263*** -0.267*** -0.204***
[0.00607] [0.00587] [0.00629] [0.00683]
Quality 0.342*** 0.348*** 0.425***
[0.00590] [0.00597] [0.00779]
∆ Claimants 0.0104 0.000744
[0.00665] [0.00699]
∆ Seekers 0.0328*** 0.0420***
[0.00533] [0.00576]
TTWA Effects N N N Y
R2 0.134 0.263 0.265 0.326
Obs. 33003 33003 33003 33003
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. The unit of observation is the Lower Super
Output Area (LSOA). Dependent variable is the change in transactions between the
benchmark (in this case (2001-2007)) and crisis (2008-2013) period. Variable ∆ Renters is the
difference in the ratio of renters over total households between the 2001 and 2011 censuses.
Quality is an estimate of quality at the LSOA level. ∆ claim is the proportional change in the
number of benefit claimants in the LSOA. All variables normalized to have a standard
deviation equal to 1.
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FIGURE XV
∆ RENTING AND TRANSACTIONS
Plot of the cross-sectional correlations between the difference in the fraction of renters and the
number of transactions for each semester between 2000 and 2013. Units are the 36,085 PS-DT
pairs with positive sales in the benchmark period.
column controls for quality, the third adds changes in economic conditions
in the area and the fourth includes metropolitan area effects. Coefficients
show that increase of one standard deviation in the fraction of households
renting implies a reduction in transactions of over 0.2 standard deviations in
all columns. This confirms the robustness of the correlation reported in XIV.
While this correlation is suggestive, it is only consistent with the proposed
explanation if it arises after 2008, when credit tightening took place. In order
to test this I calculate the cross sectional correlations between the ∆Rentj and
transj for every semester between 2001 and 2011. The correlations are plotted
in figure XV. As we can see the change in sign of the correlation takes place
during 2008, coinciding with credit tightening.
Transactions and Household Age
Young households move to neighbourhoods where other young people live
in search for lower prices but also adequate local amenities, quality schooling,
35
etc.17 While the model in section 6 does not explicitly distinguish between
young and old neighbourhoods it does predict less transactions by the young.
In this section I analyse how transactions and prices changed across areas pop-
ulated by different age groups.
For this purpose I use population and age structure data from the Office
of National Statistics disaggregated at the Lower Super Output Area Level
(see Section 2. This allows me to know the fraction of population by age for
all the LSOAs in England and Whales. I combine this information with my
transactions dataset to check if the drop in transactions and prices had an age
profile.
The results are illustrated in Figures XVI. Figure XVI plots the change in
average yearly transactions against the mean adult (over 25) population for
each LSOA. The upward sloping pattern is clear: transactions dropped less in
areas populated by older households with a correlation of 0.4.
In order to estimate the robustness of this correlation to other factors I con-
sider the following specification:
∆transj = β1Age+BXj + j
Where ∆transj is the proportional change in transactions between the bench-
mark and crisis periods in LSOA j,Age is the mean age in the LSOA taken over
2001 and 2007 period and Xj is a vector of controls defined as in the previous
subsection.
The resulting estimates are presented in Table IV. Across specifications
we observe that the coefficient on Age is positive and significant. The second
column controls for quality, the third adds changes in economic conditions in
the area and the fourth includes metropolitan area effects. Coefficients show
that areas with a one standard deviation higher mean adult age have roughly a
third of a standard deviation more transactions during the crisis and confirms
the robustness of the correlation reported in XVI.
17The high persistence of average age the LSOA level is evidence of this. LSOAs experi-
enced a median change in the average age of their residents of only -0.1 between 2001 and
2011 with 90% of changing by less than 3 years. The same picture emerges when focusing on
young households only. This persistence imply that the young move with the young (and the
old with the old) on average.
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TABLE IV
MEAN AGE AND THE CHANGE IN TRANSACTIONS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆transjt ∆transjt ∆transjt ∆transjt
Age 0.348*** 0.316*** 0.320*** 0.281***
[0.00596] [0.00572] [0.00593] [0.00694]
Quality 0.361*** 0.363*** 0.387***
[0.00706] [0.00711] [0.00985]
∆ Claimants 0.0287*** 0.0117
[0.00733] [0.00785]
∆ Seekers 0.00816 0.0183***
[0.00545] [0.00589]
TTWA Effects N N N Y
R2 0.125 0.258 0.259 0.303
Obs. 33444 33444 33444 33444
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. The unit of observation is the Lower Super
Output Area (LSOA). Dependent variable is the change in transactions between the
benchmark (in this case (2001-2007)) and crisis (2008-2013) period. Variable Age is the mean
age in the LSOA taken over 2001 and 2007 period. Quality is an estimate of quality at th
LSOA level. ∆ Claimants and ∆ Seekers are the proportional change in the number of
benefit claimants and job seekers at the LSOA level, respectively.
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FIGURE XVI
DIFFERENCE IN TRANSACTIONS BY LSOA MEAN AGE
The figure plots the average change in yearly transactions between benchmark (1995-2007)
and crisis periods (2008-2013) in the vertical axis and the mean adult age at the Lower Super
Output Area level. Adults are defined as individuals of age above 25. The slope of the fitted
linear equation is 1.27 and significant at conventional levels.
8 Alternative Explanations
This section discusses alternative explanations which could also account for
increased renting and the change in the composition of home sales. First, I
consider internal migration (within and between regions) as an alternative
source of changes in composition. To explore this possibility I use internal mi-
gration data at the district level on moves from the Office for National Statis-
tics. While internal migration fell in most markets, I find no evidence that this
fall was skewed towards moves between cheaper districts.
Another possible source of the change in composition could be related to
nominal loss aversion or negative equity of households facing a fall in home
prices. Nonetheless, I show that excluding from the sample homes sold be-
tween 2005 and 2007 (those whose values are more prone to be under their
previous selling prices during the crisis) does not change qualitative results.
Evidence from Best and Kleven (2013) shows that the stamp duty holiday
decreed in September 2008 by the British government could have an effect on
the composition of transactions. To study whether this is driving the change in
the distribution of transactions I drop from my sample the period 2008-2009
38
in which the stamp duty holiday was in place. Comparing the benchmark
period distribution with the distribution of sales in 2010-2013 the qualitative
results are preserved.
Internal Migration
In the model, transactions are treated as steps in a ladder, with an upward
life-cycle trajectory. But real transactions may also be driven by geographi-
cal moves whether between or within a region. This type of transitions have
sometimes been emphasized by the literature about the interaction between
housing and labour markets (see Head and Lloyd-Ellis (2012), Rupert and
Wasmer (2012), Nenov (2012) and the references therein). These moves are
horizontal rather than vertical in the sense that there is no obvious price or-
dering of different types of homes. In such cases, transactions are driven by
moves between regional markets or moves within a market to reduce com-
muting distance.
With the 2008/2009 recession and the ensuing increase in unemployment,
internal mobility rates in the UK decreased. This could, by itself, generate a
change in the composition of transactions solely through changes in labour
market conditions. Moreover, job market prospects for young, low income
households suffered the most during the recession. If this change in job mar-
ket conditions translated into less moves between cheaper areas it will have
decreased housing transactions in these areas and cause the stylized fact in
Section 4.
In order to explore this possibility I use data on internal migration from the
Office of National Statistics. The dataset contains yearly matrices recording
the number of moves between Local Authority Districts (LADs) for the 326
LADs in England and Wales over the 2003-2012 period.18 First, I use a method
similar to the one in section 4 to obtain a quality ranking of districts using
observed transaction prices. I then analyse whether transactions fell the most
between district pairs with lower quality. This amounts to estimating:
movesdot = αod + Crisist (β1rankorankd + β2ranko + β3rankd) + δt + it
The dependent variable movesdot is the estimated number of moves from
18Given that there is no mandatory requirement to report a move, this is a matrix of esti-
mates constructed from different data sources. For details see Internal Migration Estimates
Methodology Document - ONS Jun 2014
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district o to d in quarter t from the ONS, αod is a district pair dummy and δt is
a full set of time dummies which can be region specific. Variables ranko and
rankd indicate the rank of the origin and destination districts in the within re-
gion housing quality distribution. The coeficient of interest in this regression
is β1 which multiplies rankorankdCrisist which an interacts the rank variables
and dummy tanking value one for years after 2008 (Crisist). A positive esti-
mate for β1 would indicate that after 2008 moves were relatively higher be-
tween districts with higher ranks (i.e.: higher rankorankd).
Results are presented in table V. Note that in column 1 the coefficient for
the crisis dummy is negative indicating that moves fell after 2007, as argued
above. Column 2 uses the full sample with a full set of time dummies and
columns 3 and 4 restrict attention to within and between region moves respec-
tively. Across specifications we observe that β is negative and significantly
different from 0 in columns 1 to 3 and small and not significant in column
4. This means that there is no evidence that the reduction of between district
moves was concentrated in cheaper districts. In fact, if anything these results
suggest that internal moves fell more between relatively high quality areas. If
these movers are owner-occupiers trading between regions then this change
in transactions would operate against the stylized fact reported in Section 4.
I interpret these findings as evidence that changes in job-related moves and
internal migration did not generate the change in the composition of transac-
tions.
Negative Equity and Nominal Loss Aversion
The literature has emphasized that nominal loss aversion may reduce the
number of transactions when prices fall as households are unwilling to trade
and accrue nominal losses relative to the original purchase price (Genesove
and Mayer (2001)). In terms of prospect theory, the original purchase price
would act as a reference point for owner occupiers wanting to sell.
Loss aversion could potentially explain the change in composition if we
take into account that in some markets the fall in prices was moderately larger
for cheap homes, even if the change in relative prices was small. Buyers
of these homes would become unwilling to sell below their reference point,
hence triggering a change in the composition of sales.
A similar outcome can occur as a consequence of negative equity: falling
prices reduce the market value of a household’s residence while leaving out-
standing mortgages unaffected, often leading to a situation in which the loan
40
TABLE V
MOVES BETWEEN DISTRICTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
movdot mov
d
ot mov
d
ot mov
d
ot
highohighdCrisist -2.707** -2.707** -23.37*** 0.372
[1.124] [1.124] [8.431] [0.269]
highoCrisist 1.510** 1.510** 12.76** -0.200
[0.673] [0.673] [5.034] [0.147]
highdCrisist 1.207* 1.207* 11.27** -0.327*
[0.702] [0.702] [5.214] [0.181]
Crisist -1.839***
[0.485]
Constant 22.79*** 22.68*** 98.91*** 11.34***
[0.0499] [0.0586] [0.423] [0.0237]
Time Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Migration All All Internal External
Obs. 850208 850208 110096 740112
The unit of observation is the district pair, the dependent variable is the number of recorded
moves between those districts and Crisist is a dummy taking value one for years after 2007.
Variables higho and highd correspond to dummies taking value 1 for origin and destination
districts ranked above the regional median of the home quality distribution. Standard errors
are clustered at the level of origin destination pairs. Columns 2, 3 and 4 are estimated using
district-pair fixed effects. Column 3 restricts the sample to district pairs within the same
region (internal moves) and Column 4 restricts the sample to district pairs where each district
is located in a different region (external moves). Data on between district moves for years
2004-2011 obtained from ONS.
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FIGURE XVII
EXCLUDING HOMES SOLD IN (2005-2007)
Change in yearly transactions between 2004 and 2009. The top panel uses quality estimated at
the PS-DT level. The bottom panel uses the repeat-sales method and computes the difference
in transactions by quality deciles.
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exceeds the market value of the asset it was mean to purchase (see Henley
(1998), Ferreira, Gyourko and Tracy (2010) and the references therein). The
rapid reduction in housing prices after 2007 combined with these two factors
may explain part of the reduction in aggregate transaction volumes.
Moreover, negative equity could also explain the change in composition.
Evidence from the Wealth and Assets Survey shows that households with
large levels of outstanding mortgage debt before the crisis were, on average,
young families living in cheap homes.19 Hence, the appearance of negative
equity following the fall in house prices would be concentrated in owners of
low quality homes. If negative equity causes households to avoid selling this
could, by itself, generate the documented change in composition.
In either the case of nominal loss aversion or of negative equity, the affected
homes would be those purchased between 2005 and 2007. This suggests a
method to test whether the change in composition was driven by lock-in or
loss aversion. I re-draw the figures for changes in composition excluding from
my transactions dataset all homes sold at least once in the 2005-2007 period.
Figure XVII illustrates the results.
As we can observe, positive the correlation between quality and the change
in yearly transaction is still present after this sample restriction. Loss aversion
and lock-in may have contributed to the change in aggregate transaction vol-
umes, moreover the correlation between the change in transactions and home
quality falls slightly from 0.19 to 0.17 when excluding homes sold in the 2005-
2008. This hints that a fraction of the change in composition may be explained
by these factors. However, it is clear that these changes cannot explain away
the differential change in transactions across qualities.
A possible concern regarding the role of negative equity is re-mortgaging
by households buying before 2005. If re-mortgaging were widespread this
could keep buyers close to their credit constraint and, in this context, a fall
in prices would lead buyers into negative equity despite having bought at a
lower price before 2004. Evidence in Mian and Sufi (2011) suggest this could
be the case for the US in the run up to 2007 with the average home-owner
extracting roughly a quarter of every dollar increase in home prices. However,
data from the CML indicate that the bulk of homes with negative equity in
mid-2009 had been bought in 2006 and 2007.20
19Households headed by someone in the 30-34 age bracket have three times larger mort-
gage to value ratios that households in the 50-54 age bracket despite having cheaper homes.
Source: Wealth and Assets Survey
20Housing Finance 01-2009 published by the Council of Mortgage Lenders
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Stamp Duty Holiday
On September 2008, the UK government announced that it would raise the
lower threshold for Stamp Duty Land Tax (a tax on real estate transactions)
payment from 125,000 to 175,000. This policy (labelled stamp duty holiday by
the press) was meant to stimulate the market and was effectively a tax exemp-
tion for homes between these two prices.
As argued in Best and Kleven (2013), the policy produced a change in the
distribution of transactions which now bunched around the new 175,000 notch
rather than at 125,000. Moreover, the authors of the study show that it not only
reshuffled sales across the price distribution but also had a positive effect on
transaction volumes. From the point of view of my analysis the effects on
the intensive and extensive margin may partially offset each other (a change
in the bunching transactions from the 125 to 175 thousand pounds notch to-
gether with an increase of sales below 175000 pounds). Nonetheless, the time
of the policy almost coincides with the the differential change in transactions
documented above so it is reasonable to ask whether Section 4 results were a
consequence of this policy.
To test this I exclude from the sample transactions between September 2008
and December 2009 (the period in which the temporary stimulus was in place)
and re-draw the figures for the change in the composition of sales shown in
section 3. Results for the postcode sector-dwelling type dummies and repeat-
sales methods are presented in Figure XVIII. The figures are qualitatively the
same as the ones presented before including the holiday years.
I interpret this as evidence that the stamp duty holiday did not generate
the documented change in distribution.
9 Conclusions
This paper presents evidence on a change in the composition of traded homes
during the recent downturn in the UK housing cycle. Using several different
methods to identify home types I arrive at the same conclusion: the fraction of
total transactions corresponding to cheaper housing units decreased markedly
during the crisis, breaking a pattern of relative stability which had endured
during the boom.
As I have shown, the large change in maximum Loan-to-Value offered by
British banks can explain this change in composition. Moreover, it has of-
ten been cited as the main reason excluding young households from home-
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FIGURE XVIII
EXCLUDING HOMES SOLD IN (2008-2009)
Relation between the change in yearly transactions between 2007 and 2010 and the within-
TTWA quality. The top panel uses quality estimated at the PS-DT level. The figure plots
the contour plot of an Normal kernel density estimate with bandwidth chosen according to
Silverman’s rule-of-thumb. The bottom panel uses the repeat-sales method and computes the
difference in transactions by quality deciles.
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ownership.
In my model, tighter credit constraints imply that younger, poorer house-
holds are priced out of the ownership market by richer households. This links
the availability of credit to the composition of transactions and changes in
housing tenure distributions. While admittedly an unambiguous test of this
explanation is not provided, the model predictions are consistent with recent
observed changes in the rental market and changes in transactions by age of
neighbourhood residents.
The results are novel in several aspects. On the first place they show that
the distribution of transactions may change over the cycle and provide a new
stylized fact that could be used in other attempts to model the housing market.
Secondly, I provide a rationale for these changes in composition by incorpo-
rating changes in rental supply into the analysis. Finally, the results suggest
that deposit requirements can have a strong effect on housing tenures and
present alternative mechanisms through which these changes may come to
effect (buy-to-let and let-to-buy).
Implications for policy are clear. If the policy objective is to increase home-
ownership, the model suggests that initiatives seeking to reduce deposit re-
quirements can be effective. However, the analysis here does not take into ac-
count either worsening in affordability conditions associated with loose lend-
ing or an evaluation on the cost of these type of policies. Considering these
questions in the context of the recent Help to Buy scheme is an interesting av-
enue for future work.
This paper opens several other directions for further research. On the first
place, the analysis of the composition of transactions may be replicated for
other countries or time periods. This could illuminate whether the finding
above is a general feature of housing cycles (such as the price volume corre-
lation) or something exclusive of the recent British experience. In addition, it
provides a starting point for a detailed analysis of ’accidental landlords’ which
have grown with let-to-buy not only in the UK but also in the US.
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Appendix 1 - Model Proofs
In this Appendix I solve the model presented in section 6, proves Proposi-
tion 1 and Corollary 1. In doing so I proceed as follows: first I find the indi-
rect lifetime utility functions for different transitions, then I use these to show
the conditions necessary for the preference ordering between different tenure
transitions for different income levels. Next I set up the relevant credit con-
straint for the purchase of L or H for agents born in t and t − 1. These con-
straints determine the thresholds θ presented above. Using the expressions
for these and the equilibrium conditions I then proceed to prove Proposition
1 and Corollary 1.
Indirect Utilities
Agents solve
max
{cy ,co,hy,ho}
(cy + βco)hohy)
By choosing the timing of consumption and their residence conditional on
their budget and credit constraints. Given my assumption on the discount
rate (namely, that r ≤ 1− β
β
) we know the agent will choose to have cy = 0
and delay all consumption to the moment before death. Agents pay the costs
(and receive the benefits) of their housing decisions, save and consume. The
budget constraint for a household who rents in both periods is:
(1 + r)cy +
co
1 + r
= (2 + r)(ei −R)
Given that utility maximization ensures cy = 0 it is straightforward to solve
for co in the previous expression and substitute to obtain utility as a function
of ei for each lifetime path of tenure choices (e.g.: rent as young, buy low as
old; buy high as young, invest in a low home when old). Indirect utilities for
each path of lifetime tenure choices are the following:
v0R = φ(1 + r)((2 + r)ei −R)
vRR = (1 + r)((2 + r)(ei −R))
vRL = (1 + r)((2 + r)ei − (1 + r)R− rPL))
vLL = (1 + r)((2 + r)ei − (r(2 + r)
1 + r
)PL))
vLH = ψ(1 + r)((2 + r)ei − rPL − r
1 + r
PH)
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vLHL = ψ(1 + r)((2 + r)ei − rPL − r
1 + r
PH)
vHHL = ψ2(1 + r)((2 + r)ei − (r(2 + r)
1 + r
)PH − r
1 + r
PL +R)
Other alternative choices are possible but they are not present in the equilib-
rium configuration considered here.
Thresholds
The determination of the threshold θyR depends on the value of ei at which
v0R = vRR. Note that for ei above this value the utility of renting when young
is higher than the utility of living with the parents. From this equality I obtain
θyR =
(2 + r)− φ
(2 + r)(1− φ)R.
The other relevant thresholds are determined exclusively by credit con-
straints (as long as ψ is sufficiently high to endure that it always pays off to
move to a high home if possible). Credit constrains for home-buyers are the
following:
Young buyers of L homes for residence: ei ≥ PL−γ Old buyers of L homes
for residence: ei ≥ PH − γ + rPL
2 + r
. Old buyers of L home for investment (buy-
to-let): ei ≥ PH + PL − γ + rPH −R
2 + r
Young buyers ofH homes for residence: ei ≥ PH−γ Old buyers ofH home
for residence (trade-up): ei ≥ PH − γ + rPL
2 + r
Old buyers of H home for resi-
dence who keep their youngL homes (let-to-buy): ei ≥ PH + PL − γ + rPL −R
2 + r
Together with the threshold for renting by the young, these equations de-
termine the θs mentioned above. These are the following:
θyR =
(2 + r)− φ
(2 + r)(1− φ)R
θyL = (PL − γ)
θyH = (PH − γ)
θoL =
(PL − γ) + (1 + r)R
(2 + r)
θoH =
(1 + r)(PL − γ) + rγ + (PH − PL)
2 + r
θoHL =
(1 + r)(PH + PL − γ) + rγ −R
2 + r
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Proof of Proposition 1
The equilibrium conditions are therefore:
G(θyH)−G(θyL) +G(θoH)−G(θoL) + 1−G(θoHL) = SL (3)
1−G(θyH) + 1−G(θoH) = SH (4)
Substituting and taking derivatives with respect to γ:
(
G′(θyL) +
G′(θoL)
2 + r
)(
∂PL
∂γ
− 1
)
+
G′(θoHL)
2 + r
(
(1 + r)
∂PL
∂γ
− 1 + ∂PH
∂γ
)
= 0 (5)
G′(θyH)
(
∂PH
∂γ
− 1
)
+
G′(θoH)
2 + r
(
r
∂PL
∂γ
− 1 + ∂PH
∂γ
)
= 0 (6)
Note that trL = 1 − G(θoL) so the proposition requires that
dθoL
dγ
< 1. Given
that:
dθoL
dγ
= G′(θoL)
(
∂PL
∂γ
− 1
)
It is sufficient to show that
∂PL
∂γ
∈ (0, 1).21 To prove this consider the differ-
entiated equations (5) and (6) and proceed by contradiction. Suppose
∂PL
∂γ
> 1
in this case the first term in equation (5) is positive, requiring the second term
in (5) to be negative (to ensure the equation equals 0). This, in turn, requires
∂PH
∂γ
< −r∂PL
∂γ
. If this is the case, both the first and second terms of equation
(6) are negative so the equality is violated. Proceeding analogously we can
show that
∂PL
∂γ
< 1 and
∂PL
∂γ
> 0. Thus, we conclude that
∂trL
∂γ
> 0.
A similar procedure yields the proof of
∂SR
∂γ
< 0 and
∂trH
∂γ
< 0 completing
the proof of proposition 1.
Proof of Corollary
In order to prove the Corollary above it suffices to show that
d btl
dγ
> 0 and
d ltb
dγ
< 0. The number of buy-to-let transactions is equal to the number of
21It is not necessary to show that
∂PL
∂γ
> 0 but it is helpful for the rest of the proof.
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owners of high type homes who buy a low type home as an investment. The
number of let-to-buy transitions is equal to the number of owners who keep
their home when trading up. Given these definitions I can write:
btl = 1−G(θyH)
ltb = G(θyH)−G(θoHL)
Taking derivatives with respect to γ we can write:
d btl
dγ
= −G′(θyH)
(
d θyH
dγ
)
d ltb
dγ
= G′(θyH)
(
dθyH
dγ
)
−G′(θoHL)
(
dθoHL
dγ
)
Proving that
d btl
dγ
> 0 amounts to showing that
(
dθyH
dγ
)
< 0. To see this
note that this expression determines the sign of the first term of the sum in
equation (6). If this term is positive the same would be true for the second term
of the sum and the sum would not equal 0. To see this note that if
∂PL
∂γ
∈ (0, 1):(
∂PH
∂γ
− 1
)
> 0⇒
(
(1 + r)
∂PL
∂γ
− 1 + ∂PH
∂γ
)
> 0
To prove that
d ltb
dγ
< 0 it suffices to show that G′(θoHL)
(
dθoHL
dγ
)
> 0. To
see this note that
(
dθoHL
dγ
)
is the second term in equation (5). Insofar as the
first term in this sum is negative (as
∂PL
∂γ
∈ (0, 1)), the second term has to be
positive to satisfy the equality in (5). Therefore,
d ltb
dγ
< 0.
Hence, the Corollary is proved.
Appendix 2 - Data Sources
• The transactions data is made available by the Land Registry (go to
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/land-registry for more
information). As required by this government body I cite: Data pro-
duced by Land Registry c©Crown copyright 2015.
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• I have also used information from the Wealth and Assets Survey. The
citation for this study is the following: Office for National Statistics. So-
cial Survey Division, Wealth and Assets Survey, Waves 1-3, 2006-2012
[computer file]. 3rd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [dis-
tributor], October 2014. SN: 7215, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-
SN-7215-3
• Information for housing tenure has been obtained from the English Hous-
ing Survey. The citation for this study is the following: Department for
Communities and Local Government, English Housing Survey: Hous-
ing Stock Data. 4th Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [dis-
tributor], March 2013. SN: 7039, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-
7039-4
• Internal migration estimates were obtained fr the Office of National
Statistics.
• Data from the Council of Mortgage Lenders was obtained from tabula-
tions present in the CML’s regular bulletins.
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